Farmers in developing countries often encounter difficulties selling their products on local markets. Inadequate transport infrastructure and large distances between areas of production and consumption mean that farmers find it costly to bring their produce to the market and this very often results in small net margins and poverty amongst farmers who are geographically isolated. Agriculture in developing countries is characterized by the presence of intermediaries that have a transport cost advantage over farmers. Because of their market power, these intermediaries are able to impose interlinked contracts and are free to choose a spatial pricing policy. In this paper, we develop a model of input-output interlinked contracts between a trader and geographically dispersed farmers. We analyze what the welfare implications are as well as the effect on the trader's profit of imposing the use by the trader of either uniform or mill pricing policies, as opposed to spatial discriminatory pric... 
1 Introduction NGO's and farmers' organizations in developing countries have been pointing out the negative eects of globalization on farmers in rural areas. They blame unfair foreign competition for pushing farmers out of local markets. Smallholder farming or family farming constitutes about 80 percent of African agriculture. 500 million of such farms provide income to about two-thirds of the 3 billion rural people in the world (FAO, 2008) . While a large number of individuals in rural areas in developing countries rely on agriculture, in recent decades small-scale agriculture has suered; globalization and agro-industrialization cause small farms to go out of business (Reardon and Barrett, 2000) . Small farmers' access to land has been shown to decrease over time (Jayne et al., 2004) . Furthermore, World Bank (2008) reports that an estimated 75% of poor people in developing countries live in rural areas. Most of them depend directly or indirectly on agriculture for their livelihoods. In South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, the number of poor people in rural areas is still increasing and is expected to stay above the number of urban poor, at least until 2040 (World Bank, 2008) . The prevalence of hunger is still greater in rural than in urban areas (Von Braun et al., 2004) and rural children are nearly twice as likely to be underweight as urban ones (United Nations, 2010).
As on the one hand the agricultural sector in the developing world sees its importance decreasing and on the other hand poverty is increasing, it is important to understand what are the elements which contributed to this situation.
There are dierent reasons which explain the decline of small-scale agriculture in developing countries. One of these reasons are the high transport costs. Very often urban centers where consumption takes place are close to international transportation routes which gives foreign producers a cost advantage over local producers who face high transport costs. This results in small-scale farmers having diculties in sell their products on local markets. Another way through which transport costs aect negatively farmers is the cost of access to inputs; this, in turn, reduces their productivity and hence their competitiveness. Inadequate transport infrastructures, combined with large distances between areas of production and areas of consumption, diminish both input use and agricultural production (Staal et al., 2002 , Holloway et al., 2000 . Isolated farmers are less productive (Stifel and Minten, 2008 , Ahmed and Hossain, 1990 , Binswanger et al., 1993 and have lower incomes (Jacoby, 2000) and hence face higher poverty than farmers who have an easier access to the market. Small-scale farms, whose income is mainly used to buy food, are especially aected by the importance of transport costs, as they are not able to make the necessary investments to reduce these transport costs.
Evidence suggests that agriculture in developing countries is increasingly characterized by smallholder farmers producing commodities on contract with agro-industrial rms (IFAD, 2003) . In Mozambique, 12% of the rural population is working on a contract basis with local enterprises that are aliated with international companies. In Kenya, 85% of sugar cane production depends on small-scale farmers who provide their production to sugar companies. These intermediaries often possess an advantage over farmers. This advantage can take dierent forms. For example, it can be the ability to transport the goods at a lower cost (by the use of more ecient transport devices, such as trucks, or by transforming the product in a way that reduces the volume and/or perishability of the product, etc.). Obtaining this transport cost advantage often requires incurring an important xed cost, which cannot be borne by a farmer alone. Examples of such intermediaries include maize, beans, roots and tubers in Malawi and Benin (Fafchamps and Gabre-Madhin, 2006) , mandarin in Nepal (Pokhrel and Thapa, 2007) , cashews in Mozambique (McMillan et al., 2003) , etc.
This leads to the question of whether these intermediaries can benet farmers by helping them market their products, and hence increase their income and reduce poverty amongst them. If this is shown to be the case, then helping setting up these intermediaries (through for example grants or subsidies) would be another way to reduce poverty in rural areas. However, given the characteristics of contracts between intermediaries and farmers, some results in existing theoretical work, e.g. Gangopadhyay and Sengupta (1987) , seem to suggest that farmers would not benet from the intermediaries' lower costs. The reason is that interactions between intermediaries and farmers involve interlinked transactions. The intermediary not only buys the agricultural output from the farmer, but also provides him with the input that is necessary for his production.
With this input-output interlinked contract, the price of both goods are simultaneously xed. The use of these type of contracts has been documented for various countries and sectors (see for instance Warning and Key (2002) for an analysis of the groundnut sector in Senegal; Jayne et al. (2004) for examples of cash crops production in Kenya; Simmons et al. (2005) for an examination of various Indonesian sectors; or Key and Runsten (1999) for a look at Mexican frozen vegetable industry). While these interlinked contracts have been shown to be ecient, it has also been shown that any eciency gain is completely appropriated by the trader thereby keeping farmers at their reservation income (e.g. Gangopadhyay and Sengupta (1987) ). Extrapolating this result to our setting, this would mean that because interlinked contracts are used the presence of intermediaries has little eect on the reduction of poverty amongst farmers in rural areas.
However, the result from this literature depends on the assumption that the trader can set a dierent contract for each farmer. In a spatial context, this corresponds to assuming that the trader can perfectly price discriminate between spatially dispersed farmers. The intermediary collects the product from farmers and sets a dierent farmgate price. But spatial price discrimination is only one possible pricing policy. There are other modes of collection and hence other pricing policies that intermediaries can choose.
While also organizing the collection, an intermediary could pay all farmers the same price, independently of the distance. This corresponds to uniform pricing. Yet another possibility is that farmers are in charge of transport. This corresponds to mill pricing.
The choice of a particular pricing policy by the intermediary is important for farmers.
Mill pricing, where farmers have to support the transport cost, is disadvantageous for those located far away. Uniform pricing may seem fairer, as all producers receive the same price. However, the closest ones may receive a lower net price than if they were themselves in charge of transport. As both pricing rules are observed in practice, one may ask what drives the choice of a particular pricing policy. A priori, the optimal pricing policy is not obvious, neither from the for-prot intermediary point of view, neither from a social welfare perspective.
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In this paper, we analyze interlinked contracts in a spatial context when a trader faces geographically dispersed farmers and is free to choose the spatial pricing policy he uses. As mentioned earlier, we will consider two other spatial pricing policies besides discriminatory pricing. Under uniform pricing, the intermediary is constrained to propose the same contract, hence providing the same income, to all farmers, even if the reservation income is lower for more distant farmers. This implies that, even if such a contract contributes to increasing eciency, the intermediary is only able to extract part of the eciency gain. Farmers may gain from the contract and the presence of the intermediary may help to reduce their poverty. Facing the same contract, all farmers will produce the same quantity of the good. Intuitively, in order to induce full participation, the intermediary will propose a contract that gives an income equivalent to the highest reservation income, that is, the income of the farmer who is the closest to the market.
The farmers' rents (what they obtain above their reservation income) are increasing with distance, as they all receive the same contract income while reservation incomes decrease with distance.
In the mill pricing case, we have the added complication that not only the farmer's reservation income but also his contract income varies with location. This is because the farmer has to support the transport costs. A consequence of this is that farmers' rents may fail to be monotonic. Indeed, on the one hand, the intermediary wants to encourage farmers to produce eciently (to generate an eciency surplus), and, on the other hand, he wants to extract the largest possible share of this generated surplus. As with mill pricing the mill prices are constrained to be the same for all farmers, the intermediary is not able to set the input-output price ratio to its ecient level for each farmer. Only one farmer can be encouraged to produce the ecient quantity of the agricultural good. The farmers located further away underproduce while the ones located closer overproduce. In the presence of nonmonotonic rents, a farmer located in the interior of the market could be pushed down to his reservation level, while others obtain positive rents. Because of the possibility of nonmonotonic rents, unlike most papers in contract theory which rely heavily on the monotonicity of the rent, we cannot use the standard approach to obtain results and have to use an alternative approach to characterize the optimal contract.
In this paper, we show that one of the results of the interlinked contracts literature is more general and still holds under other spatial pricing policies: the intermediary has an interest in providing the input at a price under the market price and also to set a low price for the output. However, when intermediaries are not allowed or unable to discriminate perfectly, farmers may gain from the contract, which implies that the presence of an intermediary may help to reduce their poverty. We establish under what conditions the presence of an intermediary helps to increase farmers' production and income and as well as to reduce poverty, as measured by a Foster-Greer-Thorbecke indicator. We compare the outcomes under dierent spatial pricing policies (discriminatory, mill and uniform pricing) in terms of income, output of farmers and level of poverty, as well as how the outcome for these dierent variables varies with a farmer's geographical location. We compare the level of prot an intermediary can obtain under the dierent spatial pricing policies. This comparison of spatial pricing policies allows us to establish whether a policy recommendation can be made as to the type of spatial pricing policy that should be used by intermediaries. Initially public authorities used to be heavily involved in the marketing of agricultural products through marketing boards. And very often the pricing policy used by these marketing boards was pan-territorial pricing which sets the same price for all farmers irrespective of their geographical location; in other words, this is the equivalent of uniform pricing. State marketing boards used pan-territorial pricing in order to encourage production by poor farmers located in remote areas. Now, most of these marketing boards have disappeared and the intermediaries which have appeared on the market tend to use dierent types of spatial pricing policies. Policymakers might want to reduce poverty amongst farmers but be unable to impose a complex tax and subsidy scheme to achieve. We establish whether a restriction on the type of spatial pricing policy that intermediaries are allowed to use could achieve this goal. We determine whether, even though the public authorities are no longer directly involved in the marketing of agricultural products, uniform pricing should be kept as a pricing policy to be used by intermediaries. Some intermediaries are set up with the help of foreign donors with the objective of reducing rural poverty by helping farmers to market their products. Our results establish whether these donors should condition their aid to the use of a particular spatial pricing policy by the intermediary they are helping to set up.
The paper is structured as follows. To illustrate the ideas we develop in our paper, we start in the next section by describing some features of the milk sector in Senegal, which is characterized by the presence of intermediaries who use interlinked transactions and operate in a context where the spatial dimension is important. Section 3 presents the model and its assumptions. Section 4 develops the interlinked transaction model for a for-prot intermediary in the case of spatial price discrimination, which we use as a benchmark. Sections 5 and 6 analyze the cases of uniform pricing and mill pricing respectively. Section 7 discusses the implications of each pricing policy on the trader's prot, regional dierences in farmers' income, levels of production and poverty amongst farmers. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 Characteristics of the milk sector in Senegal As in most African countries, increased domestic dairy production in Senegal could generate additional income for a large part of the population (Staal et al., 1997 , Delgado et al., 1999 . Indeed, in Senegal 48.12% of the population (73.48% in rural areas) own cattle (ESPS, 2005) , most of them being poor: 63.28% of the households involved in agriculture, livestock and forest employment face poverty compared to 37.82% in other employments. In that sense, the development of the dairy sector has the potential to reduce poverty.
Although milk consumption in Africa is still low compared to the rest of the world, dairy products are now part of the consumption habits of most African households. In Senegal, the quantity consumed has quadrupled during the period 1961-1993. Nevertheless, despite this increased consumption, the domestic milk production has risen by less than 40% during the same period, most of the demand being satised by an increase in imports (FAOstat, 2009 ).
This stagnation of the domestic milk production is partly due to the characteristics of 5 the livestock sector: generally, each peasant has only a few cows and each cow provides between 0.5 and 2 liters of milk per day. These two elements result in small quantities, between 2 and 10 liters per day (Duteurtre, 2006) , of milk being produced. The productivity per animal is determined by its breed (local cattle breeds, Zebu Gobra, Taurine N'Dama or D'jakoré are known to have low productivity) but also by the quantity of animal feed available. About 70% of the Senegalese livestock sector operates in an agro-pastoral system where cattle are raised on pasture but feed supplements are provided by the use of organic manure and harvest residues, in particular from cotton and sesame.
One of the main constraints for improving milk production is the diculty for farmers to obtain these cattle feeds , Dieye, 2003 .
Another factor which hampers the increase of production are high transport costs.
The nature of milk makes it dicult to transport it over large distances. While production takes place mainly in rural areas of the country, consumption is concentrated in Dakar, sometimes at more than 300 kilometers from the producers. An inadequate transport infrastructure also contributes to high transport costs.
As incurring large costs for transporting small quantities of milk may turn out to be unprotable, farmers often prefer not to take part in the market, or to participate only occasionally, resulting in very low quantities of milk being commercialized on the market. In a similar context in Ethiopia, Holloway et al. (2000) found that each additional minute walk to the collection center reduces the marketable quantity of milk by 0.06 liters per day. In a region where milk yields per day are less than 4 liters, this is of considerable importance. High transport costs also have a negative impact on the use of feed supplements. In Kenya, whose milk sector is comparable to the Senegalese one, Staal et al. (2002) have found that an additional 10 kilometers between the farmer and Nairobi decreases the probability of using concentrate feed by more than 1%. More isolated farmers are also poorer. In Senegal, while poverty is 35% amongst households who are able to reach a food market in less than 15 minutes, it increases to 63% for those who have to travel more than one hour to reach such a market. This group represents a relatively large share of the population (20%).
Since the Nineties, Senegal as well as other West African countries have seen the emergence of small-scale processing units called mini-dairies that play the role of an intermediary between farmers and the market , Corniaux et al., 2005 . These intermediaries have some kind of advantage over farmers to sell the products on the market. They use more ecient transport devices, such as trucks; they own bulk cooling tanks so that they can stock the milk and do not have to transport it every day to the market, etc. This cost advantage requires a xed cost, that for isolated farmers with a low income (of which a large part is used to buy food) is important and cannot be borne by each farmer on his own. (Dieye, 2006) . The same pattern is observed in the other regions (Broutin, 2005 and 2008) .
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Contracts between mini-dairies and farmers often involve interlinked transactions. In the region of Kolda, Dieye et al. (2005) report that milk processing units provide credit and cattle feed to farmers in order to increase production. The two most important mini-dairies in this region (Bilaame Puul Debbo and Le Fermier) use three dierent mechanisms for linking milk purchase and the selling of animal feed: credit for feed purchase, direct feed purchase for the farmer, or guarantee to the feed seller in case of non-payment by the farmer (Dieye, 2006) . In Northern Senegal, La Laiterie du
Berger buys large quantities of cattle feeds and resells it to the farmers at 50 percent of the market price (Bathilly, 2007) .
The spatial dimension plays a key role in the milk sector. In Senegal, areas of milk production are located far from the capital city (360 km for Richard-Toll where La Laiterie du Berger operates, 250 km for Dahra where is the DINFEL collection area), while most of the consumers are located in Dakar. On average, households' expenditure for milk consumption is 218 CFA per day in Dakar whereas it is 107.5 CFA in other regions (ESPS, 2005) . In the rural area, the transport cost is also important compared to the price received by the farmers. In Kolda, where the price received by the producers ranges between 75 and 150 CFA, transport by bicycle costs between 20 and 25 CFA per liter (Dia, 2002) . Motorized transport is even more costly; according to one of the managers of La Laiterie du Berger (personal interview, 2009), average transport cost on its collection area is 100 CFA per liter, while farmers receive 200 CFA per liter.
To our knowledge, spatial price discrimination is not used in the milk sector in Senegal. Mini-dairies use either uniform or mill pricing. For instance, La Laiterie du Berger organizes milk collection and pays all the farmers the same price, independent of the distance. This corresponds to uniform pricing. In Le Fermier however, farmers are responsible for transport, such that the ones who are located far from the processing unit receive a considerably lower net price than the closer ones. This corresponds to mill pricing.
In Senegal, the milk production, which stagnated for 30 years, began to increase in the Nineties. One possible explanation for this evolution lies in the emergence of these so-called mini-dairies. The theoretical model we develop in the following sections allows us to analyze the impact of the presence of such intermediaries on production, farmers' income and poverty under dierent spatial pricing policies when interlinked contracts are used. As explained earlier the presence of interlinked contracts means that farmers will not necessarily gain from contracting with intermediaries. Hence, we cannot immediately conclude from the observation that the production has increased that farmers have eectively gained from this evolution. Our model helps us establish under what conditions poor farmers benet from the presence of these intermediaries.
Model
We analyze the impact of transport costs and interlinked transactions on poverty in the following theoretical framework. A nal good market is located at the origin 0 (See Figure 1) . We consider one agricultural good which is sold at price p on this market. We assume that the dierent agents in our model do not have an impact on 7 this price.
1 This good is consumed at location 0 which can be assumed to be an urban center. Geographical locations are represented along a line. A position x on this line represents a geographical location which is located at a distance x from the market. Furthermore, there is a rural area which starts at a distance r from the urban center and has a geographical extend R. Farmers are uniformly distributed over this rural area. 
Farmers are assumed to be prot maximizers. A farmer located at x facing farmgate prices p F (x) and i F (x) maximizes his income y(p F (x), i F (x)) by using the optimal quantity k(p F (x), i F (x)) (for simplicity, as long as it does not cause any confusion, notations y(x) and k(x) will be used):
The existence of an interior solution to this problem is guaranteed by the above assumptions regarding the production function. The choice of input quantity satises the following necessary condition:
As the agricultural good is produced at one location and consumed at another, transport costs have to be incurred to bring this good to the market. These costs are assumed to be linear in distance. To simplify the analysis we assume that transport costs are negligible for the input and set them equal to zero.
2 A farmer located at a distance x from the market faces a transport cost t(x) = τ x and hence this farmer can obtain a net per unit price p F (x) = p − τ x for the good he produces. In this paper, we analyse how the presence of an intermediary can improve farmers access to the market. We do 1 This can be the case for example because we are in a small open economy and the price of this good is determined on world markets.
2 This also reects the fact that in reality the transport cost for the input is eectively zero as the input is purchased when the output is delivered.
not analyze a related question of whether the presence of an intermediary inuences the participation of farmers. Hence we make the following assumption: Assumption 1. All farmers are able to protably sell on the same market as the trader.
This implies the following restriction on the parameter values, p > p ≡ τ r + τ R. An intermediary is located at r. Assumption 2. Independently of the pricing policy the trader nds it in its interest to oer contracts to all farmers.
This implies that we restrict ourselves to certain parameter values.
4 As in the examples mentioned in Section 2, we consider situations in which a single trader with a cost advantage buys the agricultural good from farmers and sells them an input. Hence, uncertainty does not play a role and there are no incentive problems. If in addition the trader would not be able to enforce nonlinear contracts because he would not be able to prevent arbitrage between agents, the best strategy for the trader is to oer linear interlinked contracts to the farmers (see e.g. Ray (1998) , Bardhan and Udry (1999) ).
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Hence, there is an input-output interlinked relationship between them: on the one hand 3 In developing countries, poor infrastructures in rural areas reduce the incentives for intermediaries to locate within these rural areas. By locating just outside of a rural area, the intermediary has a better access to roads to urban centers, electricity, water, etc. Because of the limited number of farmers involved and the potentially large xed investment costs, further entry would unlikely be protable. Hence the intermediary is assumed to have monopoly/monopsony power when he trades with the farmers. On the nal market, however, the intermediary is price-taker.
4 The limit r + R can be seen has a physical limit of the production area. It can be due to the existence of a national border, to the absence of farmers beyond a certain distance, or to technical limits for transporting perishable goods over long distances. It can be shown that for parameter values that
+ θr + τ (R/2), the trader nds it optimal to oer contracts to all farmers independently of the pricing policy used (see Appendix F).
Alternatively, complete market coverage could be explained not by the fact that it is protable, but because of social reasons, the trader may not be able to contract only with some farmers of a local community.
5 The literature has identied dierent reasons for the emergence of interlinked transactions. Among the dierent reasons we have rationed or imperfect rural credit (Gangopadhyay and Sengupta, 1987; Chakrabarty and Chaudhuri, 2001) , output market price uncertainty (Chaudhuri and Gupta, 1995) , risk aversion (Basu, 1983; Basu et al., 2000) , unobservable tenant eort (Braverman and Stiglitz, 1982; Mitra, 1983) or the inability to collude (Motiram and Robinson, 2010) .
the trader buys the output from the farmers and, on the other hand, sells them an input necessary for their production. Prices for both input and output are simultaneously xed in the contract between the trader and the farmer. The trader sells the agricultural output from the farmers and buys input for them on the market located in 0, at market price p and i respectively. The sequence is the following. In a rst step, the trader proposes a contract (p C (x), i C (x)) to each farmer located on the segment [r, r + R]. Very often, the quantities produced by each individual farmer are small. We assume that contract prices do not depend on the quantity sold. The farmer located at x receives p C (x) per unit of output and pays i C (x) per unit of input. Each farmer can individually accept or reject the contract. In a second step, each farmer chooses his optimal quantity of input, which determines his level of production. If he has accepted the contract, he faces prices
If he rejects the contract, he sells his production directly to the nal market. The same applies to the purchase of inputs. In this case, he chooses the optimal amount of input k 0 , which is a function of market prices (p, i) as well as of the transport cost he has to support, that is k
In a last step, output is produced and sold on the market, either directly by the farmer (if he has rejected the contract) or via the trader (if the farmer has accepted the contract).
This means that the trader's problem can be characterized as follows:
where F is the xed cost necessary to obtain the transport cost advantage, 6 subject to the demand for input (3.2) and the following participation constraint:
for all x ∈ [r, r + R]. One of the questions we will be looking at is whether, without state intervention, the dierent outcomes are socially optimal. The ecient input use, k # (x), maximizes the sum of trader's prot and farmer's incomes
Given θ < τ and the concavity of production function, this implies that for all x, k 0 (x) < k # (x): in the stand-alone situation, farmers use too little input compared to what is socially optimal.
In the following sections we will look at dierent ways in which the trader can set contracts with farmers who are geographically dispersed.
6 Hereafter, we omit this cost F as it has no inuence on the optimization result. We assume that F is not too high with respect to the prot that can be made by the intermediary while being too high for a single farmer to incur.
4 Spatial price discrimination
The trader proposes to each farmer a contract (p D (x), i D (x)) in function of the farmer's location x. Depending on the location of the farmer, this contract can be dierent and the dierence in two farmers' contracts does not necessarily represent the dierence in transport costs between them. Each farmer can individually accept or refuse the contract proposed. Hence, to maximize his total prot, the trader chooses a contract which maximizes the prot he makes at each location.
From equations (3.3) and (3.4), the trader's problem may be written as:
The Lagrangian is given by:
Noting that at equilibrium df dk
and applying the envelop theorem to the income of the farmer, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions can be written as:
Multiplying (4.4) by p D (x) and (4.5) by i D (x), adding these two expressions up, and because input demand k * (x) is homogeneous of degree zero in both prices, this yields:
If the second term were equal to zero, this would imply that y(x) = 0 so that g(x) < 0, which contradicts (4.6). Thus, the rst term has to be equal to zero, which implies that λ(x) = 1. Substituting this in either of the rst order conditions yields:
). This contract induces the farmer to increase his level of input (as well as his level of output) with respect to the levels he would have chosen in the stand-alone case, even though he receives the same income, as it is stated in the following proposition. Proposition 1. Under spatial price discrimination, the trader induces each farmer to use the ecient quantity of inputs, which is larger than in his stand-alone situation (k * (x) = k # (x) > k 0 (x)), while keeping the farmer at his reservation income level (y(x) = y 0 (x)).
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Proof of Proposition 1: As the ratio of input price to output price is given by (4.8), this tells us, by using (3.2) and comparing it to (3.5), that the farmer will choose the ecient level of input: k * (x) = k # (x). Given that τ > θ and that f (k)
is strictly concave and using (3.2) with respectively (p
have from (4.6) that this implies that the individual rationality constraint is binding:
Substituting (4.8) in the binding participation constraint g(x) = 0 gives:
Note that, with these prices, arbitrage between farmers is impossible: it can be shown that, for any farmer's location x, he has no interest in transporting the good by himself to another location z in order to benet from the prices (p D (z), i D (z)). The potential gain from such an action is always lower than the incurred transport cost. Corollary 1. Under spatial price discrimination, the trader loses on the input trading (i D (x) < i) and gains on the output trading (p D (x) < p − θr − τ (x − r)).
Proof of Corollary 1: As
written as:
Using the envelop theorem and since by assumption θ < τ , this implies that η D (x) = δ D (x) < 1. Using this result with (4.9) and (4.10) this implies that p D (x) < p − θr − τ (x − r) and i D (x) < i. 
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It can be easily seen, as it is done in Gangopadhyay and Sengupta (1987) , that if there were no cost dierence between the trader and the farmer (i.e. τ = θ), the optimal contract would be characterized by η D (x) = δ D (x) = 1, and the role of the trader would be irrelevant. If he has no cost advantage, the trader is not able to organize the production in a more ecient way than farmers do.
Corollary 2. Under spatial price discrimination, each farmer gains on the input trading (i D (x) < i) and loses on the output trading (p D (x) < p − τ x).
Proof of Corollary 2:
From (3.2), (3.5) and Proposition 1, this is equivalent to
This is true provided that the production elasticity df dk
is constant or decreasing in k. The result i D (x) < i follows from Corollary 1.
When involved in the interlinked transaction, each farmer receives a price for the output which is lower than the net price he would have received in the stand-alone situation. This loss on the output trading is compensated by a gain on the input trading, such that, as Proposition 1 states, each farmer obtains an income y(x) from the contract which is exactly equal to his reservation income y 0 (x).
The results show that farmers are treated dierently depending on their location.
On the one hand, farmers located far from the market receive a lower price for their output, but on the other hand they also pay a lower price for input. Moreover, those farmers receive a smaller share of the net price received by the trader on the market for the output and pay a lower part of the input price. Indeed, from (4.9) and (4.10),
it can be shown
In Kenya, British American Tobacco Ltd delivers input to farmers at prices that are in most cases lower than the Nairobi wholesale prices for similar products, while Kenya Tea Development Agency Ltd supplies bags of fertilizer at a price signicantly lower than the wholesale price in Nairobi and much lower than the retail price oered to the smallholders by the village-level stockists (IFAD, 2003) .
Sometimes, input is even given for free (Koo et al., 2012 , IFAD, 2003 .
8 The rst derivative of η D (x) with respect to x is negative if f (k
As θ < τ , a sucient condition for this to be true is that
which is ensured by the concavity of the production function and the
are also decreasing in x since
13 prices p D (x) and i D (x) are increasing with the output market price p.
9 We also have that η D (x) (= δ D (x)) increase with p which means that trader's mark-up on the output and discount on the input are lower when p is higher. These results seem to indicate, as mentioned before, that the presence of an intermediary or a trader with a cost advantage, would serve eciency, increase production, but would not directly benet farmers. This would mean that setting up intermediaries would not be a way to help farmers. However, spatial pricing discrimination is only one possible pricing policy. We now turn to two other pricing policies and show that in these cases, the results are somewhat modied.
Uniform pricing
Under uniform pricing policy, the trader is constrained to propose the same contract (p U , i U ) to all farmers (where p U and i U are independent of x). Each farmer can individually accept or refuse the contract proposed.
The trader's problem can be written as:
Note that k * is the same for all farmers, independent of their location (see (3.2) where p F (x) = p U and i F (x) = i U are independent of x). As farmers are distributed on the interval [r, r+R], there is a continuum of participation constraints g(x) with x ∈ [r, r+R]. The satisfaction of the constraint for the rst farmer (located at r) is sucient to ensure that it is satised for all farmers located further (in x ∈ ]r, r + R]). Indeed, as k * is constant for all x and y 0 (x) is strictly decreasing in x, g(x) is strictly increasing in x.
Thus, we can replace the continuum of constraints g(x) ≥ 0 by the unique constraint g(r) ≥ 0 (see for instance Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005: 82) . The problem is now the following:
Noting that at equilibrium df dk = i U p U and applying the envelop theorem to the income of the farmer, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions can be written as:
Multiplying (5.2) by p U and (5.3) by i U , adding these two expressions up and noting that the input demand k * is homogeneous of degree zero in both prices, we have
If the last term were equal to zero, this would imply that y(r) = 0 such that g(r) < 0, which contradicts (5.4). Thus, the rst term has to be equal to zero, that is: λ = R.
Plugging this result into either rst order condition yields:
Equation (5.6) characterizes the optimal contract (p U , i U ). This contract implies that each farmer receives the same income from the contract as the stand-alone income of the rst farmer. Proposition 2. Under uniform pricing, if the trader's cost advantage is large enough (τ r − θr > τ (R/2)) the trader induces each farmer to increases his quantity of inputs with respect to the stand-alone situation (k * (x) > k 0 (x)) and the trader keeps the closest farmer at his reservation level (y(r) = y 0 (r))
while the other farmers obtain a positive surplus from the contract. If the trader's cost advantage is too small (τ r − θr ≤ τ (R/2)), he is not able to make a positive prot.
Proof of Proposition 2: Since λ = R, we have from (5.4) that this implies that the individual rationality constraint is binding:
is strictly concave and using (3.2) with respectively
r) and τ r ≤ θr + τ (R/2), we have that Π ≤ 0.
Contrary to the spatial price discrimination case, when the trader is able to operate protably under uniform pricing, all the farmers except the rst one see an increase in their income with respect to their stand-alone situation. Using this policy, La Laiterie du Berger claims that its presence has allowed to triple the income of the farmers involved (PhiTrust, 2011).
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Substituting (5.6) in the binding participation constraint g(r) = 0 gives:
Corollary 3. Under uniform pricing, when τ r − θr > τ (R/2), the trader loses on the input trading (i U < i) and gains on average on the output trading (p U < p − θr − τ (R/2)).
Proof of Corollary 3: Note, from (5.6) and (3.5), that k * = k # (r + (R/2)). Thus, η U = δ U may be written as:
Using the envelop theorem, τ r − θr > τ (R/2) implies that η U = δ U < 1. Using this result with (5.7) and (5.8) implies that p U < p − θr − τ (R/2) and i U < i.
Propositions 2 and 3 imply that the trader is able to make a positive prot only if there exists a sucient advantage in transport cost, i.e. τ r − θr > τ (R/2).
11 In this case, he loses on the input trading and gains on the output trading, as the average net price he receives on the market is higher than the price he pays to each farmer, similarly to what happens in the spatial price discrimination case. However, if his cost advantage is too small, he is not able to protably induce farmers to organize production in a more ecient way. This result is in contrast with the result obtained under price discrimination, where the trader is able to exploit his cost advantage, even if the advantage is very small.
As it was the case with spatial price discrimination, when the trader's cost advantage is large enough, contract prices under uniform pricing p U and i U are increasing with the output market price p. The same applies for η U = δ U , which means that farmers receive a higher share of trader's gain on the output transaction, but pay a higher share of the input price, when p is higher. 10 Higher income due to the contract is also consistent with empirical evidence in other contexts. 
6 Mill pricing
Under a mill pricing policy, the trader pays the same mill price to all farmers. He proposes the same contract (p M , i M ) to all farmers (where p M and i M are independent of x) and farmers have to support the costs of transporting the good to the trader . Thus, the net price for the output received by the farmer at location x is p F (x) = p M −τ (x−r).
As farmers are distributed on the interval [r, r + R], there is a continuum of participation constraints g(x) with x ∈ [r, r + R]. Contrary to the uniform pricing case, which constraint(s) will be binding at the optimum is a priori not obvious. Indeed, one cannot determine a priori whether or not the contract income decreases at a faster rate with distance than the reservation income. As Jullien (2000) shows, when both reservation and contract utility depend on the agent's type (in our case, his location), it may be the case that the constraint is binding at either end of the interval of agent's type, but it may also be the case that one or several interior agents face binding participation constraints while agents at the extremes of the market do not. In the proof of Lemma 1 (Appendix A), we show that, if the production function is homogeneous, the latter does not occur. Indeed, we show that the outcome will be one of the four following Using Lemma 1, the problem can be written as:
In Lemma 2, we prove that the case where contract prices are such that only the rst farmer's income is pushed down to the reservation level (case (2) above) is dominated by the replication of the stand-alone situation (case (3)). Indeed, in the rst case, the trader induces all farmers to decrease their production, compared to their stand-alone level, which is not optimal from the trader's point of view. Hence, if the rst farmer's participation constraint is binding at the optimum, this implies that all participation constraints are binding at the optimum and that i M = i and p M = p − τ r.
Lemma 2. Under mill pricing, if the production function is homogeneous of degree h < 1 and g(r) = 0 at the optimum, this implies that g(x) = 0 at the optimum for all x.
Proof of Lemma 2: See Appendix B.
Model with a specic production function
In what follows, we use a particular production function to derive some characteristics of the equilibrium.
If the participation constraint of the most remote farmer is binding, this implies that i M < i. If it were not the case, the binding participation constraint would imply that p M > p − τ r, and this, in turn, would not respect the participation constraint for the other farmers. However, the unconstrained equilibrium could be such that i M > i and p M > p − τ r. Indeed, a priori one could think that it could be possible to nd a contract such that each farmer loses on the input but gains on the output, while no participation constraint is binding. In what follows, we show that the trader has no interest to do so, such that, at the optimum, i M ≤ i always holds.
Proposition 3. Under mill pricing and Assumption 3, the prot maximizing contract is characterized by i M ≤ i, the trader loses on the input trading.
On the other hand, the trader gains on the output trading (p M < p − θr).
Proof of Proposition 3: See Appendix D.
Corollary 4. Under mill pricing and Assumption 3, except in the case where the stand-alone case is replicated, the prot maximizing interlinked contract implies that each farmer increases the quantity of input he uses, and hence increases his production, compared to his stand-alone alternative.
Proof of Corollary 4: The participation constraint has to be satised for all x. As the production function is homogeneous, this means that i M k In particular, La Laiterie du Berger claims that the feed supplements it provides to the farmers have helped them to increase their production, especially during the dry season (own interview, 2009). This is also observed in other sectors using interlinked contracts.
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Using Lemma 2 and Proposition 3, the problem for the trader under mill pricing can be written as:
Contrary to uniform pricing and spatial price discrimination, under mill pricing the optimum is not always constrained. Whether the optimum is constrained or unconstrained depends on the value of the output price p as well as on the importance of the trader's cost advantage τ − θ compared to the size R of the rural market.
12 In the Indian poultry sector, Ramaswami et al. (2006) have found that contract production is more ecient than noncontract one and that the eciency surplus is largely appropriated by the processor.
In Ethiopia, Tadesse and Guttormsen (2009) have estimated that producers of haricot bean who are in relational (interlinked) contract supply about 27% more than farmers in spot markets.
Proposition 4. Under mill pricing and Assumption 3:
• If the trader has a large cost advantage (τ r − θr > τ R) and if the output price is large (p >p withp unique), then the most distant farmer's income is pushed down to his reservation level (g(r + R) = 0) while other farmers obtain a positive surplus from the contract. For a lower output price (p ∈ [p,p]), all farmers, including the last one, obtain a positive surplus from the contract (g(x) > 0 ∀x).
• If τ R/2 < τ r − θr ≤ τ R, then the most distant farmer's income is pushed down to his reservation level (g(r + R) = 0) while other farmers obtain a positive surplus from the contract for all p > p.
• If τ R/3 < τ r − θr ≤ τ R/2 and if the output price is large (p >p withp unique), then all the farmers' incomes (including the income of the last farmer) are pushed down to their reservation level (for all x g(x) = 0).
This means that the trader simply replicates the stand-alone situation.
For a lower output price (p ∈ [p,p]), only the most distant farmer's income is pushed down to his reservation level (g(r + R) = 0) while the other farmers obtain a positive surplus from the contract.
• If the trader has a small cost advantage (τ r − θr ≤ τ R/3), then for all p > p all the farmers' incomes (including the income of the last farmer)
are pushed down to their reservation level and the stand-alone situation is replicated.
Proof of Proposition 4: See Appendix E.
These results
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show that under mill pricing the optimal pricing by the trader is not always to simply charge farmers the prices they face in a stand-alone situation and to make a prot from the transport cost advantage he has. In particular, if his cost advantage is large enough, the trader uses it to introduce a distortion in the prices in order to induce farmers to produce more and hence increase his prot even more.
If the trader's transport cost advantage is large and the output price is low, the optimum is unconstrained, meaning that the contract which is optimal from the trader's point of view leads to higher incomes for all farmers compared to their stand-alone situation. This is due to the low level of the stand-alone income which is a consequence of both low output price and high farmer's transport cost. When the output price is larger, this is no longer possible. Indeed, as θ is bounded at 0, the trader's cost advantage cannot be larger than τ , and cannot compensate the increase in the reservation income due to a higher output price. The result that with a sucient transport cost advantage 13 The assumption here is that the trader has to cover completely the market. If the trader optimally chooses his market coverage, it can be shown that for τ R/3 ≤ τ r − θr ≤ τ R the condition p > p has to be replaced by the condition p > p α (R) to ensure complete market coverage. See Appendix F.
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for a low output price all farmers benet from contracting with the trader is interesting in a context where agricultural output prices are often driven down by international competition. This means that if international competition drives down prices all farmers benet in terms of a higher income from the presence of intermediary if mill pricing is used. In contrast, under the two other pricing policies (discrimination or uniform pricing), for any value of p there is always at least one farmer who is pushed down to his reservation income.
On the contrary, if the trader's transport cost advantage is small and if the output price is large, then the contract which would be optimal from the trader's point of view would lead to incomes for the farmers that are lower than their stand-alone incomes.
Indeed, the high output price lead to large reservation incomes that cannot be compensated by the trader's cost advantage as it is too small. In this case, the best the trader can do in order for the farmers to accept the contract, is to replicate their stand-alone situation.
Poverty and policy implications
As explained before, Senegalese milk production is characterized by the use of small quantities of input (cattle feed) and the production of small quantities of output. Milk producers have low income and most of them can be considered as poor. The empirical literature on various agricultural sectors in developing countries shows that remote farmers use less inputs (Staal et al., 2002) , produce or sell less (Holloway et al., 2000, Stifel and Minten, 2008) and have a lower income (Jacoby, 2000) than those who are less isolated. Helping them market their products may contribute to reduce rural poverty and boost socio-economic development in rural areas. In this context, we look at measures regarding pricing by intermediaries that could be adopted by policy makers to increase farmers' production, input use and income.
We have shown that, whatever the pricing policy used, the optimal interlinked contract chosen by an intermediary who has a sucient transport cost advantage induces each farmer to increase the level of input he uses compared to his input use in the standalone case and hence to increase his production. However, this does not always result into an increase in the farmers' incomes as the eciency gain may be completely acquired by the trader. In what follows, we look at what a policy maker who wants to decrease poverty amongst farmers, but is unable to impose a complex tax and subsidy scheme, should impose as a spatial pricing policy to be used by intermediaries. Our analysis also establishes whether foreign donors setting up intermediaries with the aim to help farmers should restrict the spatial pricing policy used by these intermediaries.
As the farmers are geographically dispersed, they will be aected dierently by the dierent pricing policies. We need an indicator which gives us an aggregate measure of poverty. There are potentially dierent ways to measure this. To measure poverty amongst farmers, we follow Foster et al. (1984) and adopt the following poverty indicator:
where z > 0 is poverty line (the income shortfall of the farmer located at x is given by z − y(x)), R − q is the number of poor farmers (who have an income lower than z) and α can be seen as a measure of poverty aversion, a larger α giving greater emphasis to the poorest farmers. The larger is P ov α , the higher is the poverty. In order to establish which pricing policy used by the intermediary performs better in reducing poverty with respect the stand-alone situation, we compare the outcomes of the dierent pricing policies in terms of this poverty indicator.
We also use the squared coecient of variation as a measure of the inequality amongst the poor (Foster et al., 1984) :
r+R r+q y(x)dx is the average income for the poor farmers. This measure of the inequality is associated with P ov 2 in the sense that it is obtained when R − q and y are substituted for R and z in the denition (7.1) with α = 2. The indicator dened in (7.2) ranges between 0 and 1, being equal to 0 when perfect equality is satised.
If discrimination is possible and costless, in a laissez-faire situation, the for-prot trader will choose to discriminate as it leads to the highest prot. In this situation, the ecient optimum is reached. However, no farmer's poverty is reduced, as they all get the same income as in their stand-alone initial situation. While the presence of a trader who has a transport cost advantage is benecial from an eciency point of view, it is not from a poverty reduction one.
A policy maker whose aim is to increase farmers' incomes may want to tax the trader's prot in order to redistribute it amongst farmers. However, it is possible that public authorities in developing countries do not have the capacity of doing so. In what follows, we look at what a policy maker can achieve in terms of poverty reduction by restricting the type of spatial pricing policies that intermediaries can use.
If the trader's transport cost advantage is large enough, imposing uniform pricing leads to an increased income for the poorest farmers, while richer ones are not worse o. Indeed, under this policy, only the farmer the closest to the market, that is, the one who has the highest initial income, is not able to increase his revenue. All the others are able to obtain a positive surplus from the contract, and hence to increase their income.
Equality among farmers is ensured, as they all receive the same income and produce the same quantity. However, if the dierence in transport cost between the trader and the farmers is small, imposing uniform pricing does not allow the trader to make a positive prot and to exploit his cost advantage to increase production.
If the trader has a suciently large cost advantage, requiring him to use mill pricing also increases the income of most farmers. But, contrary to the uniform pricing case, farmers far from the trader, who were already poor, gain less than the one close to the trader. Mill pricing increases inequality amongst farmers, with respect to their stand-alone situation, but also with respect to a situation where the trader is allowed to spatially discriminate.
The previous discussion is illustrated by Figure 2 , which represents farmers' income and output as a function of distance, under the three pricing policies when τ r − θr > τ R Producers' organizations in developing countries and NGOs argue that prices for agricultural goods are too low and claim that they remain low due to unfair international competition caused by subsidized exports from industrialized countries. This is seen as one of the reasons which keeps small producers in poverty (see for instance Oxfam (2002) or CFSI (2007) on the milk sector). In a context in which p is very low, imposing mill pricing to a trader who has a large cost advantage may result in increasing all farmers' income, including the most distant one. Numerical simulations also show that, when p is small, mill pricing may be preferred to uniform pricing by a majority of farmers 14 and that the sum of all farmer's incomes may be higher under mill pricing. If the policy-maker's objective is to choose a policy that increases farmers' total income and/or is preferred by the majority of them, then he should impose mill pricing when output price p is low. However, when the output price is high, uniform pricing is preferred by a majority of farmers and leads to a higher total farmers' income, even if the rst farmer's income is always pushed down to his reservation level.
Regarding poverty, as measured by the indicator dened in (7.1), spatial price discrimination does not contribute to poverty reduction, as it does not permit to increase farmers' income. Numerical simulations (see Figure 3 (a)) show that mill pricing tends to perform better in reducing poverty for low values of p while uniform pricing dominates when the output price is larger. Note that, when poverty aversion is large, that is α is large (not represented here), uniform pricing dominates mill pricing in terms of poverty reduction, as more emphasis is given to the poorest (the most distant farmers) who have a larger income under uniform pricing. With very large α, P ov α approaches a Rawlsian measure which considers only the income of the poorest farmer. If the policy maker has a Rawlsian objective, the uniform pricing policy should always be encouraged.
The eect of the pricing policies on the inequality amongst the poor is illustrated in Figure 3 (b). It can be seen that uniform leads to perfect equality, as all farmers get the same income, while mill pricing may lead to the highest level of inequality, the closest farmers being favored with respect to the most distant ones.
The question which remains is whether the intermediary will choose the pricing policy which is optimal from the point of view of poverty reduction or if an intervention by the policy marker is necessary. Figure 4 shows the level of prot for the dierent pricing policies in function of output price p.
Not surprisingly, for all three spatial pricing policies, the prot is increasing in output price p. Not surprisingly either, price discrimination dominates the two other pricing policies. The ranking between mill pricing and uniform pricing depends on the level of the output price: for a low level of p, the intermediary will prefer uniform pricing while for a high level of p the intermediary will prefer mill pricing. If the intermediary's cost advantage is small, imposing uniform pricing will result in a negative prot. Under mill pricing and discriminatory pricing, however, the trader is able to contract protably with all farmers, whatever the level of cost advantage.
Putting the information of the last two gures together yields the following conclusions. When p is low, the intermediary prefers uniform pricing while mill pricing leads to the lowest level of poverty. When p is high, we have the opposite result: mill pricing is preferred by the intermediary while it is uniform pricing which is the best in terms of poverty reduction. In these cases, the public authorities should impose a particular pricing policy to the intermediaries if its objective is to reduce poverty amongst geographically dispersed farmers. Only in the case of intermediary values of p will the in- termediary choose the pricing policy which is also the optimal policy in terms of poverty reduction.
Conclusions
In this paper, we develop a model of input-output interlinked contracts between a trader and geographically dispersed farmers, and analyze the implications of dierent spatial pricing policies used by this trader. We look at three dierent spatial price policies, namely spatial price discrimination, uniform pricing and mill pricing.
We assume an agricultural output market that is characterized by large transport costs. The intermediary has a (transport) cost advantage over the farmers from whom it buys their production. This cost dierence leads to an input-output interlinked contract between the intermediary and the farmer. A rst result is that the use of an interlinked contract by a trader who has a sucient transport cost advantage leads to an increase of the farmer' production, independently of the type of pricing policy used by the intermediary.
If the for-prot intermediary is able to perfectly discriminate contracts between farmers, this would be his preferred option. This allows him to push all the farmers' incomes down to their stand-alone initial income and hence appropriate all the eciency gain generated by the contract. If this is the case, the presence of the intermediary, while improving agricultural eciency, does not directly help to reduce rural farmers poverty.
In practice discriminatory pricing might not be feasible and other pricing policies exist, such as uniform pricing, where the trader bears the transport costs and concludes the same contract with all the farmers, or mill pricing, where farmers are in charge of transport, and receive the same price at the mill. If the trader's cost advantage is large enough, we show that in both cases, most farmers obtain a positive surplus from the contract, while the trader is still able to make a prot. In the mill pricing case, under some conditions we can have a situation in which all the farmers, including those located the furthest from the market, see an increase in their income.
We show that imposing a uniform pricing policy to the trader who has a suciently large cost advantage leads to an increase of isolated farmers' income. Providing the same income to all farmers, uniform pricing favors relatively more isolated farmers, since they are the ones who initially receive a lower income. Moreover, when the output market price is large enough, uniform pricing also leads to a reduction of farmers' poverty, as measured by a Foster-Greer-Thorbecke indicator. In this case, it is also preferred to mill pricing by a majority of farmers, and it leads to higher total farmers' income.
In developing countries, agricultural market prices are often driven down by international competition. If output market prices are very low, imposing mill pricing may be the best alternative. Indeed, it may increase all farmers' income, including the closest and the most distant one. This is not possible under uniform pricing, whatever the output market price. When the output market price is low, mill pricing performs better in reducing poverty than uniform pricing does. Moreover, there may be cases in which both total farmers' income and median farmer's income are higher under mill than under uniform pricing. Additionally, if the trader only has a small cost advantage, under mill pricing he still may be able to increase most of the farmers' income, while under uniform pricing he cannot protably contract with the farmers.
We also generalize the result found in Gangopadhyay and Sengupta (1987) , thus k * (x) < k 0 (x) ∀x. Compared to Case (2), the trader can always obtain a higher prot by replicating farmers' stand-alone situations (that is, proposing a contract where p M = p − τ r and i M = i, such that each farmer uses k 0 (x) and obtains his reservation income y 0 (x)). In this case the prot is given by Π case3 = r+R r (p−θr−τ (x−r))f (k 0 (x))−ik 0 (x)−y 0 (x)dx. We have that Π case3 > Π case2 .
Indeed, from the participation constraints, y(x) ≥ y 0 (x), and, given our assumptions on f (k), the function (p − θr − τ (x − r))f (k(x)) − ik(x) is concave in k(x) and maximized in k # (x) dened by (3.5). Comparing with (3.2) we see that k # (x) > k 0 (x). Thus,
, implying that k 0 (x) and k * (x) lie in the increasing part of the function, thus (p−θr−τ (x−r)f (k 0 (x)))−ik 0 (x) > (p−θr−τ (x−r)f (k * (x)))−ik * (x) ∀x.
As trader's prot could always be increased, the case (2) cannot characterize the optimum. Eliminating case (2) from the possible outcomes, the rst farmer's participation constraint can never be the only one to be binding at the equilibrium.
C Mill pricing: unconstrained outcome
The unconstrained outcome is the solution to the maximization problem when λ = 0 and µ = 0. Plugging this in (6.3) and (6.4), and using f (k) = 2 √ k gives us after simplication: 
We have H τ R 2 < 0 and H (p − θr) > 0. In addition, we have H (p M ) > 0 which means that there is a unique value for p M between τ R 2 and p − θr such that H (p M ) = 0. If there is a solution such that p M > τ R, then i M < i . To see this, note that whenever p M > τ R the term between the rst square brackets is positive which implies that the term between the second square brackets has to be negative. Plugging this in the equation (8.3) implies that i M < i.
To establish under what conditions p M = p − τ r we evaluate H (p M ) at p M = p − τ r which yields
